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COMBATING CYBERBULLYING WITHIN
THE METES AND BOUNDS OF EXISTING
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
INTRODUCTION
Phoebe Nora Mary Prince, a pretty blue-eyed Irish teenager,
moved to South Hadley, Massachusetts, in the summer of 2009. 1 A
troubled girl, Phoebe had a history of bipolar disorder, depression,
and self-mutilation. 2 The move to America seemed like the perfect
opportunity to make a fresh start. She started her freshman year at
South Hadley High School that fall.3 Unfortunately, the new girl
quickly became the target of ruthless and insufferable harassment at
the hands of her peers. 4
Much of the bullying stemmed from Phoebe’s relationships with
certain boys. 5 One female classmate, jealous that a boy she liked was
taking Phoebe to a school dance, told Phoebe she should kill herself. 6
Other students called Phoebe an “Irish slut,” physically threatened
her, and knocked books from her hands on a daily basis. 7 Someone
also scribbled her out of a class picture hanging up at school.8 Even at
1 Ramin Setoodeh, Phoebe Prince’s Legacy: A Town Tries To Heal, PEOPLE, Oct. 18,
2010, at 63; Anne-Marie Dorning, New Developments Raise New Questions in Suicide of
Phoebe Prince, ABC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/settlement-federalinvestigation-raise-questions-wrongdoing-case-15/story?id=12394493&page=1.
2 Jessica Bennett, From Lockers to Lockup: School Bullying in the Digital Age Can Have
Tragic Consequences. But Should It Be a Crime?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 2010, at 38, 40.
3 Jessica Van Sack et al., Pal: Suicide Victim Target of Bullies: Girls ‘Jealous’ of
Popular Teen, Friend Says, BOS. HERALD, Jan. 26, 2010, at 6.
4 Erick Eckholm & Katie Zezima, 9 Teenagers are Charged After Suicide of Classmate,
N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 2010, at A14. One student believes Phoebe was chosen because she was
new, different, and unfamiliar with the school. Id.
5 Setoodeh, supra note 1, at 63. Two boys, including the football team captain, were
charged with statutory rape shortly after Phoebe committed suicide. Id. at 60–63; Eckholm &
Zezima, supra note 4, at A14.
6 Van Sack, supra note 3.
7 Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 4, at A14.
8 Bennett, supra note 2, at 39.
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home, Phoebe found no safe haven. Her bullies mocked her on
Facebook 9 and harassed her via text messages. 10
It all became too much for Phoebe. In January 2010, while Phoebe
was walking home from school, some students hurled a crumpled
soda can and shouted obscenities at her from a passing car. 11
Although she had endured similar treatment over the past several
months, 12 at that moment Phoebe’s suffering crescendoed, and she
text-messaged a friend that she “[couldn’t] do it anymore.”13 Her little
sister found her hanging from a stairwell later that afternoon. 14
Phoebe is just one of the many teens who have taken their lives in
response to relentless bullying. In Ohio, four students from the same
high school killed themselves within a three-year span as the result of
teen bullying. 15 One of the students, Jennifer Eyring, was bullied
because of her learning disability. 16 She pleaded with her mother
every morning to let her stay home and, when forced into school,
needed Pepto-Bismol to calm her stomach. 17 Jennifer overdosed on
antidepressant pills in 2006. 18 Eric Mohat and Meredith Rezak, close
friends, faced ruthless harassment because their peers believed they
were gay. 19 In 2007, the friends shot themselves to escape their
pain. 20 A year later, Sladjana Vidovic also committed suicide after
months of ridicule from fellow students. 21 Classmates called Sladjana
a “slut” and made fun of her thick Croatian accent.22 She ultimately
jumped out of her bedroom window with a rope tied around her
neck. 23
While these Ohio students were all victims of traditional bullying,
modern technology now plays a significant role in many teen
suicides. For example, Jessica Logan, a student in the Cincinnati

Id.
Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 4, at A14.
11 Bennett, supra note 2, at 39.
12 Peter Schworm & Brian Ballou, 9 Teens Charged in Girl’s Bullying, BOS. GLOBE, Mar.
30, 2010, at Metro 1 (reporting comments of the District Attorney that “[t]he events were not
isolated, but the culmination of a nearly-three month campaign of verbally assaultive behavior
and threats of physical harm”).
13 Bennett, supra note 2, at 40.
14 Id. at 39.
15 Meghan Barr, 1 Ohio School, 4 Bullied Teens Dead at Own Hand, MSNBC.COM (Oct.
8, 2010, 2:56 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39578548/ns/health-kids_and_parenting.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. Eric’s parents requested that the coroner label his death “bullicide.” Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
9

10
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suburb of Montgomery, Ohio, 24 hanged herself in 2008 after an exboyfriend disseminated nude photographs of her to hundreds of
students. 25 Female classmates called her a “slut” and “whore.” 26
According to her mother, Jessica committed suicide because the
harassment became unbearable.27 Tyler Clementi committed suicide
after his roommate, Dharun Ravi, allegedly broadcast a live sexual
encounter between Tyler and another male over the Internet. 28 When
Tyler learned of the broadcast, he jumped off the George Washington
Bridge into the Hudson River. 29
Stories such as these have led the media to suggest that bullying
has reached pandemic levels. 30 Indeed, bullying is a growing problem
in American schools. One hundred sixty thousand children will miss
school today for fear of being bullied. 31 With the advent and
popularization of the Internet, an age-old practice has taken on an
entirely new form. Victimization that was once limited to buses and
playgrounds now extends to the home computer and cell phone. 32
Victims can no longer find a safe haven in their bedrooms. 33
This Note explores the cyberbullying controversy, focusing on the
conflict between the desire of schools to provide a safe learning
environment and the First Amendment rights of their students. 34 Part I
discusses the seriousness of bullying and why it is particularly
harmful in the cyber age. Part II then details the Supreme Court’s
treatment of student speech and a school’s ability to regulate that
24 Mom’s Fight to End Cyber Abuse, CBS NEWS (May 14, 2009, 11:35 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/05/14/earlyshow/main5013235.shtml?tag=contentMain;c
ontentAux.
25 Id.; see also Timothy Wilson, Teens Online and on Cells But Not on Their Guard:
Group Calls Attention to Safety Concerns, WASH. POST, July 9, 2009, at District Extra 3
(reporting that one-fifth of teens have sent, received, or forwarded sexually explicit photos
through text message or email).
26 CBS NEWS, supra note 24.
27 Id.
28 Alex Tresniowski et al., Tormented to Death?, PEOPLE, Oct. 18, 2010, at 56, 56.
29 Id.
30 See Bennett, supra note 2, at 39. (acknowledging the ‘dozens of articles that have called
bullying a “pandemic”).
31 20/20
(ABC
television
broadcast
Oct.
15,
2010),
available
at
http://abc.go.com/watch/2020/SH559026/VD5592259/bullied-to-death-victims-stories.
32 See Kevin Turbert, Note, Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judicial Responses to
Cyberbullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651, 652 (2009) (“Playground bullies have exchanged
their brute-force tactics for electronic weapons.”).
33 See
What is Cyberbullying?, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL,
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/what-is-cyberbullying (last visited Oct. 2, 2011)
(noting that cyberbullying is viewed as more extreme by the victim because it occurs in his or
her home).
34 This First Amendment discussion applies only to public schools. The First Amendment
only protects against government speech restrictions. Because private schools are not state
actors, the protections in the Bill of Rights do not apply. ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP:
THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 35 (2009).
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speech when it materially or substantially disrupts the work and
discipline of the school or invades the rights of others under Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District. 35 Part III
explains that the majority of lower courts have extended the Tinker
standard to off-campus speech. These holdings suggest that, because
it ostensibly occurs within the school environment, cyberbullying can
be regulated by school officials as student speech. But, Part IV argues
that this approach is misguided, resulting from the application of the
Tinker standard to circumstances that the Supreme Court never
intended, and that schools, in fact, lack the constitutional authority to
regulate off-campus student Internet speech. Finally, Part V explores
alternative methods to combat cyberbullying and proposes a
legislative approach that would compel schools to promote awareness
within their communities and implement stringent on-campus
bullying policies. The inclusion of such a model policy could also
clarify the line between constitutionally protected speech and
unprotected bullying that is subject to school discipline.
I. THE CYBERBULLYING PROBLEM
The Center for Safe and Responsible Use of the Internet defines
cyberbullying as “being cruel to others by sending or posting harmful
material or engaging in other forms of social cruelty using the Internet
or other digital technologies.”36 Cyberbullying takes many forms: a
bully may create a website that makes fun of the victim, circulate
cruel or harmful material about the victim, or exclude the victim from
buddy lists and chat rooms. 37 Bullying of any kind may result in
depression, anxiety, chronic illness, poor self-esteem, substance
abuse, family problems, and suicidal ideation.38 Moreover, victims of
cyberbullying are nearly twice as likely to commit suicide as
compared to the general population. 39
Cyberbullying is more harmful than traditional bullying for several
reasons. For instance, online content is “harder to wash away than

393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
Nancy Willard, Cyberbullying Legislation and School Policies: Where Are the
Boundaries of the ‘Schoolhouse Gate’ in the New Virtual World?, CTR. FOR SAFE &
RESPONSIBLE INTERNET USE 1 (Mar. 2007), http://csriu.org/cyberbully/docs/cblegislation.pdf.
37 See NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 33.
38 See Id. (describing the effects cyberbullying may have on victims); Turbert, supra note
32, at 655 (relating research findings which show that bullying may cause depression, anxiety,
and other ailments).
39 Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, Battling the Bullies; West Islip Girl Scout Makes her Points at
House Hearing; Tells of a Classmate Who Suffered From Online Attack, NEWSDAY, June 25,
2010, at A08.
35
36

11/6/2011 4:02:30 PM

2011]

COMBATING CYBERBULLYING

239

comments scrawled on a bathroom wall,” 40 and its cruelty thus
constantly plagues its victim. 41 Cyberbullying’s victims are also
unable to escape torment, even in their own home 42 and may be in
perpetual fear of another attack. 43 This anxiety often results in poor
academic performance and increased absences from school. 44
Moreover, because cyberbullies can cloak their identities through
screen names and e-mail addresses, victims may not even know who
is tormenting them, 45 which can add to the anonymity that often
motivates the bullying in the first place, and transforms school into an
unwelcome and unsafe environment. 46
Cyberbullying’s electronic medium can also lead bullies to be
crueler to their victims. Because cyberbullying occurs “from a
physically distant location . . . the bully does [not] . . . see the
immediate response of the target.” 47 As a result, cyber-attacks can be
particularly brutal. Psychologists have concluded that “‘the [physical]
distance between bully and victim . . .
is leading to an
unprecedented—and often unintentional—degree of brutality,
especially when combined with a typical adolescent’s lack of impulse
control and underdeveloped empathy skills.’” 48
Finally, unlike in the lunchroom or on the playground, there is
little supervision in cyberspace. 49 Parents who lack technological
savvy may not realize that their children are bullies.50 Even if parents
discover that their son or daughter is harassing another student
Bennett, supra note 2, at 39–40.
See SHAHEEN SHARIFF, CONFRONTING CYBER-BULLYING: WHAT SCHOOLS NEED TO
KNOW TO CONTROL MISCONDUCT AND AVOID LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 45 (2009) (“[O]nline
communications have a permanence and inseparability that is difficult to erase.”).
42 NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 33 (“Being bullied at home can take
away the place children feel most safe.”).
43 See Karly Zande, When the School Bully Attacks in the Living Room: Using Tinker to
Regulate Off-Campus Student Cyberbullying, 13 BARRY L. REV. 103, 112 (2009)
(“[Cyberbullying] [v]ictims may be in constant fear for their safety . . . .”).
44 SHARIFF, supra note 41, at 37.
45 See id. at 44 (“Fear of unknown cyber perpetrators among classmates and bullying that
continues at school distracts all students . . . from schoolwork.”).
46 SHARIFF, supra note 41, at 44.
47 Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying: Identification, Prevention, and
Response,
CYBERBULLYING
RESEARCH
CTR.
2
(2010),
http://www.cyberbullying.us/Cyberbullying_Identification_Prevention_Response_Fact_Sheet.p
df.; see also Kelleher, supra note 39 (“[Bullies] don’t have to look their target in the eye.”).
48 Turbert, supra note 32, at 654 (quoting Amy Harmon, Internet Gives Teenage Bullies
Weapons to Wound From Afar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A1).
49 Zande, supra note 43, at 110.
50 See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 47, at 2 (noting that many adults lack the
technological know-how to monitor their children’s Internet use); Dr. Phil Takes Up CyberBullying
Fight,
CBS
NEWS
(July
1,
2010,
3:06
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/24/earlyshow/main6613649.shtml
(noting
that
modern children are more computer literate than their parents).
40
41
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through the Internet or a cell phone, they may believe that bullying is
a common form of schoolyard behavior.51 Moreover, victims of
cyberbullying may find it difficult to disclose their victimization.52
Dominique Napolitano, a fifteen-year-old who testified before a
House committee on the issue in June 2010, explained that victims
are afraid that the bullying will become worse if they seek help from
an adult. 53 Unfortunately, when parents, schools, and communities
fail to intervene—because of unfamiliarity with modern technology,
indifference toward the situation, or any other reason—children learn
that such behavior is tolerable. 54
The number of students who fall victim to cyberbullying is unclear
because of definitional uncertainty and significant variation among
research findings. 55 One fact, however, is clear—cyberbullying is a
major societal problem without a simple solution. If school officials
attempt to restrict cyberbullying to protect some of their students,
they risk infringing upon the First Amendment rights of others.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Even though cyberbullying has harmful, and sometimes deadly,
consequences, even bullies have constitutional rights. Internet speech
may be entitled to First Amendment protection. Schools must,
therefore, have the constitutional authority to regulate this expression
if they wish to address the cyberbullying problem. 56
Students are “persons” under the Constitution and are thus
unquestionably entitled to free speech rights. In Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 57 the Supreme Court
famously held that “[i]t can hardly be argued that . . . students . . .
51 See Cindy Gallagher, Sticks and Stones Have Remedies at Law—It is Name-Calling
That Hurts Kids: Can State Anti-Bullying Statutes Really Help Kids Who Are Victims of InSchool Bullying?, 4 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 21, 24 (2002) (noting that cultural and social
norms discourage school personnel from reprimanding students for inappropriate bullying
because they are “just being kids”).
52 Kelleher, supra note 39.
53 Id. (“[T]hey’re afraid things will get worse. . . . Am I going to be cyberbullied even
more because of it?”) (quotation omitted).
54 See id. (failure of school district to intervene suggests approval).
55 See Stop Cyberbullying Before it Starts, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL,
http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/bullying/cyberbullying.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2011)
[hereinafter Stop Cyberbullying] (finding that 43 percent of teens have been cyberbullied in the
past year); Bennett, supra note 2 (reporting that twenty percent of American students are bullied
each year); Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 47, at 1 (noting the wide variation in survey
estimates, from ten to forty percent or more, of the number of youths experiencing
cyberbullying).
56 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
57 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate.” 58 In fact, the First Amendment plays an
important role in public education. As the Supreme Court noted in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents 59:
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools. The
classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The
Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any
kind of authoritative selection. 60
On the other hand, the right to free speech is not boundless. 61
While the First Amendment may protect speech that promotes
different perspectives in the classroom, it may not insulate a bully’s
japes from punishment. It would seem absurd to argue that the future
of our nation depends upon allowing bullies to harass their classmates
and disrupt the learning environment. 62 Thus, the law must draw a
delicate line between student speech that promotes First Amendment
interests and that which does not. 63
The Supreme Court made this distinction in Tinker. In that case, a
group of students planned to express their opposition to the Vietnam
War by wearing black armbands to school. 64 When school officials
became aware of the plan, they adopted a policy stating that any
student wearing a black armband to school would first be asked to
remove it and then suspended if he or she refused to do so. 65 In
considering the constitutionality of this school policy, the Court
created the Tinker standard: schools can regulate student speech only
58 Id. at 506; see also id. at 511 (“Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect,
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.”).
59 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
60 Id. at 603 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“[S]tudents must always remain free to inquire, to study
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate
and die.”).
61 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[T]he right of free
speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”).
62 See Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“There is no constitutional right to be a bully.”).
63 See DUPRE, supra note 34, at 2 (identifying the conflict between “the rights of
individual students to speak . . . [and] the rights of other students to learn”).
64 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). Five children
were involved in the protest. The younger children, aged eight and eleven, were left out of the
case for fear the court would question whether they had their own political views or were acting
at the direction of their parents. DUPRE, supra note 34, at 26.
65 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
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when it “materially or substantially disrupt[s] the work and discipline
of the school.” 66 To satisfy this burden, schools must show “more
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” 67 On the facts before it,
the Court found that the school could not make this showing and,
therefore, its armband prohibition violated the students’ First
Amendment right to free speech.68
Courts commonly view Tinker as the default standard to apply in
student speech cases, unless the facts fall within one of three
categories authorizing schools to constitutionally restrict their
students’ speech even absent a material disruption. The first category,
articulated in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 69 allows a
school to prohibit speech if the speech is vulgar or lewd and “would
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.” 70 The speech at
issue in Bethel involved sexually explicit metaphors in an address at a
school assembly. 71 While the Court recognized an “undoubted
freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools
and classrooms,” it ultimately found that the student’s innuendo
crossed the line of socially acceptable behavior. 72 Hence, “it was
perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the
point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly
inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school
education.” 73
The second category, found in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 74 permits schools to exercise control over schoolsponsored speech if their actions are “reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.”75 In Hazelwood, a high school principal
redacted student articles on teen pregnancy and divorce from a
school-sponsored newspaper. 76 The Court considered it a decisive
factor that readers could perceive the speech as school-sponsored,
66 Id. at 513. A consensus has emerged among lower courts that Tinker also includes
threats of material or substantial disruption; see, e.g., Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that student speech at issue “falls well short
of the Tinker standard for reasonably anticipating a disruption of school activities”); see also
Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1129,
1152 n.140 (2009) (noting that Tinker created a reasonable anticipation test).
67 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
68 Id. at 514.
69 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
70 Id. at 685.
71 Id. at 677–78.
72 Id. at 681.
73 Id. at 685–86.
74 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
75 Id. at 273.
76 Id. at 264.
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noting that “[a] school must be able to set high standards for the
student speech that is disseminated under its auspices . . . .” 77
The Court’s third category, found in Morse v. Frederick, 78 permits
schools to “take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug
use.” 79 In Morse, a principal forced a student to take down a fourteenfoot banner unfurled at a school-sponsored event that read “BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS.” 80 The Court permitted the principal’s action and
held that the principal did not violate the First Amendment by
confiscating the banner and suspending the student.81
These cases leave many questions unanswered for school officials
attempting to solve the cyberbullying dilemma. Most significantly:
does the Tinker standard apply to off-campus Internet speech? In each
of the cases discussed above, the student conduct took place on
campus 82 or at a school-sponsored event. 83 While the Court could
have addressed off-campus speech in Morse, as the banner was
displayed at an off-campus field trip, it explicitly chose not to do so. 84
Many lower courts have attempted to resolve this unanswered
question. Unfortunately, as Part III of this Note demonstrates, they
have not reached a clear consensus.
III. LOWER COURTS APPLYING TINKER TO OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT
SPEECH
Although most courts view Tinker as the default standard in
student-speech cases, 85 federal courts generally disagree as to whether
the standard applies to off-campus, Internet speech. For example, on
February 4, 2010, two different panels of the United States Court of
Id. at 271–72.
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 397.
81 Id.
82 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263–64 (1988) (students wrote
articles for a school-sponsored newspaper disseminated at school); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986) (student gave inappropriate speech during a school
assembly); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (students
wore black armbands to school).
83 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (student unfurled a banner at a school-sponsored event that
was held during normal school hours).
84 See id. at 401 (“There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts
should apply school speech precedents, but not on these facts.”) (citations omitted).
85 Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students are “Persons” Under Our
Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2009) (“Most courts
continue to recognize Tinker as supplying the default standard under which regulation of student
expression is to be judged unless the facts fit one of the relatively narrow exceptions carved out
by the Supreme Court.”).
77
78
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Appeals for the Third Circuit handed down contradictory decisions
regarding the First Amendment’s protection of student-created,
parody Myspace profiles of their school principals. 86 Most courts
have held that schools can restrict students’ off-campus speech,
though none have addressed cyberbullying in particular.87 These
Third Circuit decisions, however, exemplify the confusion that
continues to surround the issue of students’ off-campus, Internet
speech.
Those in support of extending Tinker to regulate off-campus
student Internet speech employ the conventional “substantial
disruption” test to justify such a result. One justification views Tinker
through a modern perspective. 88 Tinker considered the school
environment as it was in 1969—when the country was in the midst of
an antiwar, free-speech movement, 89 but the school landscape has
changed dramatically since that time. One commentator noted that
“the Internet marks [a] landscape change as dramatically as the Front
Range marks the end of the Great Plain.” 90 In light of modern
technology, the idea that the school environment described in Tinker
now extends to cyberspace has become quite popular. 91
Proponents of this position also focus on the consequences of the
expression rather than the physical location where it occurred. They
86 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated en banc, 650
F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), was handed down the same day as Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist.,
593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’d 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011); see infra notes 150–53 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of Layshock. The Third Circuit, sitting en
banc, has since reheard both cases in an effort to resolve the confusion surrounding the
conflicting decisions. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011); Layshock
v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
87 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (holding that schools may regulate student speech if the speech
materially disrupts school work and discipline). In addition to the material disruption test,
Tinker also appears to allow the restriction of student speech where it “colli[des] with the rights
of other students to be secure and to be let alone.” Id. at 508. In Harper v. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used this standard to uphold a ban on T-shirts
denouncing homosexuality from a school campus. The court concluded that the T-shirt
“collide[d] with the rights of other students in the most fundamental way.” 445 F.3d at 1178
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Harper is the only reported case that relies on the
second factor of Tinker to regulate student speech; it also lacks precedential value. See County
of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1979) (noting that “vacating the judgment of
the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of precedential effect”) (internal quotation
and citation omitted).
88 That same environment now extends to cyberspace, far beyond the actual campus. See
SHARIFF, supra note 41, at 117 (explaining that the school environment is “no longer restricted
to the campus”).
89 Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still Standing, 58
AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1185 (2009).
90 DUPRE, supra note 34, at 231 (citation omitted).
91 See, e.g., Zande, supra note 43, at 133 (arguing that the Tinker standard should be
applied to cyberspeech and off-campus student speech).
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assert that no distinction should be made between on-campus and offcampus speech. As Judge Newman of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit argued in a concurring opinion,
“territoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the
limit of [a school’s] authority.” 92
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
advanced an argument similar to Newman’s in Wisniewski v. Board of
Education. 93 In that case, a school punished a student who created an
online chat icon suggesting the execution-style murder of his English
teacher. 94 The student created the icon off-campus, and it came to the
attention of school officials only after another student supplied the
teacher with a copy. 95 The court, applying Tinker, found that the
school could punish the student for creating the icon because it
represented a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption
within the school environment, despite the fact that the expression
occurred off campus. 96
The Second Circuit also applied the “foreseeable risk of substantial
disruption” test in Doninger v. Niehoff. 97 In Doninger, school
officials’ decision to postpone an annual battle-of-the-bands concert
that Student Council members had planned led a student to criticize
the “douchebags in [the] central office” on her publicly-accessible
blog. 98 School administrators received numerous phone calls in
response to the post, 99 which contributed to the court’s conclusion
that the post “created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the
work and discipline of the school” and, therefore, that the school
could discipline the student. 100
Similarly, in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 101 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that a school
92 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J.,
concurring in judgment); see also Zande, supra note 43, at 133 (“[S]chool[s] should be able to
punish . . . cyberbully[ing] regardless of the physical location where it occurred.”).
93 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
94 Id. at 36. The icon depicted a pistol firing a bullet at someone’s head and splattered
blood. The words “‘Kill Mr. VanderMolen’” appeared below. Id.
95 Id. at 35–36.
96 Id. at 40.
97 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
98 Id. at 45.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 53. This case also yielded significant precedent with respect to qualified
immunity. The Second Circuit held that, because the student’s First Amendment free speech
rights were not clearly established at the time of the incident, the principal and superintendent
were entitled to qualified immunity. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 356 (2d Cir. 2011).
Under the relevant test, the court found that it was objectively reasonable for these school
officials to conclude that the student’s post was potentially disruptive to the degree required by
Tinker. Id. at 348–49.
101 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010) vacated en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011). The Third
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“need not wait until a substantial disruption actually occurs,” but may
meet its burden by “demonstrate[ing] any facts which might
reasonably have led [it] to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities.” 102 In that case, the court
allowed the suspension of a middle-school student who created a
Myspace profile of her principal. Even though the profile was created
entirely off-campus, 103 it could be accessed only from an off-campus
location, 104 and had caused no actual disruption,105 the court found no
First Amendment violation because, based on the threat of substantial
disruption, the school was entitled to punish the student for creating
the profile. 106
Finally, in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 107 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the suspension
of a student who bullied her classmate with a Myspace page called
“Students Against Sluts Herpes” because her speech interfered with
the work and discipline of the school. 108 The court reasoned that,
although the student created the page at home, she knew that her
message would be heard by other students and that the fallout “would
be felt in the school itself.” 109 In rendering its decision, the Fourth
Circuit seemed particularly concerned with the “mean spirited and
hateful” nature of the page and noted that bullying “must be taken
seriously by school administrators . . . .” 110
Federal courts have also expressed their willingness to sanction
schools’ regulation of off-campus expression under Tinker had the
school established an actual disruption. In Killion v. Franklin
Regional School District, 111 for example, a student published a topten list about his school’s athletic director in an e-mail commenting

Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently held that the school district violated the student’s First
Amendment free speech rights when it suspended her for creating the Myspace profile. J.S. v.
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court explained that “[t]he
facts simply do not support the conclusion that the School District could have reasonably
forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference with the school as a result of [the]
profile.” Id. at *11.
102 J.S., 593 F.3d at 298 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 514 (1969)).
103 Id. at 291. The student created the profile entirely from her home. Id.
104 Id. at 292. The Middle School computers blocked access to MySpace. Id.
105 See id. at 299 (finding that the profile created minor inconveniences rather than a
substantial disruption).
106 Id. at 303.
107 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
108 Id. at 572–73.
109 Id. at 573.
110 Id. at 577.
111 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
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on the relationship between the administrator’s weight and his
genitalia. 112 The United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania compared the situation to J.S. v. Bethlehem Area
School District, 113 in which the teacher was so traumatized by a
website created about her that she was forced to take medical
sabbatical for the next year.114 Applying the Tinker standard, the
Killion court determined that the school was not entitled to suspend
the student because it had shown no actual disruption.115 As compared
to Bethlehem, the speech was not threatening and did not cause the
teacher to take a leave of absence. 116
IV. THESE COURTS ARE MISGUIDED
Many courts utilize the “substantial disruption” test to justify the
constitutionality of schools’ punishment of off-campus student
speech. The Court in Tinker, however, did not so much as hint that
the standard should be applied to off-campus speech. 117 Conversely,
the Court relied exclusively on on-campus scenarios and locations in
reaching its decision:
A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours,
he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects
like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially
and substantially interfering with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and
without colliding with the rights of others. 118
Moreover, while the expression in Morse took place off school
property, no Justice seriously contended that the students were
anywhere but at a school-sponsored event. 119 Student Internet speech,
112 Id. at 448. The list contained statements such as “[b]ecause of his extensive gut factor,
the ‘man’ hasn’t seen his own penis in over a decade.” Id.
113 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
114 Id. at 852.
115 Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
116 Id.
117 See Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 270 (2001) (noting that the
Tinker court “never suggested that [its] limitation on students’ speech rights applied outside of
the school setting . . . ”).
118 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (emphasis added)
(internal citation and quotation omitted); see also Calvert, supra note 89, at 1177 (noting that
the Court reasoned with on-campus scenarios and on-campus locations during school hours
when adopting its “substantial disruption” test).
119 DUPRE, supra note 34, at 241.
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on the other hand, occurs almost exclusively off campus and during
non-school hours. The Supreme Court has never held that schools
may regulate such speech.
Schools should not be permitted to punish a child for the words
that he utters in his home solely because he or she is a student. The
Supreme Court has allowed schools remarkable deference in the
management of on-campus speech. 120 Judges are far removed from,
and thus less inclined to interfere with, the day-to-day operations of
schools. 121 However, school officials could abuse this discretion if
they were able to regulate off-campus speech. Former law clerk and
current Harvard professor Martha Field 122 expressed concern to the
Tinker Court that “school officials [could] hypothesize the requisite
likelihood of disorder for anything that they [did not] like, for
whatever reason, including reasons that violate the First Amendment,
and administer a highly discriminatory system.” 123
This fear is easily realized by allowing the limited First
Amendment analysis afforded to student speech made on campus to
follow a student home merely because of his or her status as a
student. 124 Schools could prohibit students from discussing entire
topics, such as opinions about teachers or administrators, when in the
privacy of their own homes. 125 Additionally, “there would be little to
prevent school officials from regulating adult speech uttered in the
community.” 126 After all, “[a]dults often say things that give rise to
substantial disruptions in public schools.” 127 Certainly the Tinker
Court would not have endorsed these results. 128
120 See LoMonte, supra note 85, at 1354; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (Those officials involved in the educational process perform
“important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions . . . .”).
121 See DUPRE, supra note 34, at 17 (noting that, while most judges and justices are “better
educated than most teachers and principals,” they are “not trained to run schools, and they are
far removed from the day-to-day problems in the classroom”).
122 Faculty
Directory,
HARVARD
LAW
SCHOOL,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=19 (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
123 Bowman, supra note 66, at 1160 (citation omitted).
124 See LoMonte, supra note 85, at 1326 (criticizing those courts that have “accept[ed]
uncritically the proposition that the special First Amendment infirmities under which students
labor on school premises during school time follow these young people everywhere they go by
dint of their student status”); id. at 1355 (observing that the unique student/school relationship
seems to be recognized only where uniqueness works to disadvantage the speaker).
125 Id. at 1355; see also J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 939 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Smith, J., concurring in judgment) (“Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would create a
precedent with ominous implications. Doing so would empower schools to regulate students’
expressive activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it
involves—so long as it causes a substantial disruption at school.”).
126 Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (Smith, J., concurring in judgment).
127 Id.
128 See Calvert, supra note 89, at 1175 (“[S]ome lower courts are now using—misusing,
really—Tinker in a situation and scenario that the Court in 1969 could hardly have imagined.”).
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Parents, not schools, should punish children for their off-campus
expression, 129 unless the children intend for their speech to reach
school grounds. As one commentator has argued, “[s]chools must not
be allowed to usurp control from parents over the off-campus speech
and off-campus behavior of their children simply because such speech
or behavior relates to or is somehow about other students or
administrators.” 130 When children are away from school property and
not engaged in school-sponsored activities, they are not students.
They are, rather, “minors under parental control and supervision.” 131
Provided that children do not deliberately and physically disseminate
their off-campus speech on campus, students should be afforded the
same constitutional protections as non-students. 132
A handful of courts have adopted this stance. The Second Circuit’s
decision in Thomas v. Board of Education, 133 the Fifth Circuit’s
Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, 134 and Layshock v.
Hermitage School District 135 all analyzed issues of off-campus
student expression and ultimately did not permit the regulation of
such expression. 136 Moreover, in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School
District, 137 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
sitting en banc, reversed and remanded the Middle District of
Pennsylvania’s ruling that suspension was an appropriate punishment
for a student who created a fake Myspace profile that made fun of her
middle school principal.138 As discussed above, a Third Circuit panel
had previously upheld the suspension. 139

129 See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ,, 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[S]chool officials . .
. are not empowered to assume the character of parens patriae”); see also Turbert, supra note
32, at 678 (“[W]hen a school punishes a student’s at-home online activity, is its intervention
blurring the separation of power between school authority and parental authority?”).
130 Calvert, supra note 89, at 1178.
131 Id. at 1179.
132 See LoMonte, supra note 85, at 1354 (“[O]ff-campus speech by students . . . stands on
the same footing as speech by any other citizen, so long as the student does not physically
disseminate the speech on campus.”); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding that absent a constitutionally valid reason for regulation,
students are entitled to express their views).
133 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
134 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
135 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
sitting en banc, vacated its original decision and reached a result similar to that of the initial
panel. The court held that the school district violated the student’s First Amendment free speech
rights when it disciplined him for creating the profile. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
136 See infra notes 137–53 and accompanying text.
137 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
138 Id. at 920.
139 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010) vacated en banc, 650
F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).
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Thomas involved a handful of students who were suspended for
publishing an underground newspaper addressed to the school
community. 140 The students stored the publication in a closet at
school and occasionally typed the articles within the school.141
However, the Second Circuit was satisfied that most of the work was
done in the students’ homes, off-campus, and after school hours. The
court reasoned “[t]hat a few articles were transcribed on school
typewriters, and that the finished product was secretly and
unobtrusively stored in a teacher’s closet [did] not alter the fact that
[the magazine] was conceived, executed, and distributed outside the
school.” 142 In making a distinction between parental and school
discipline, the court noted that activities such as this fall outside the
jurisdiction of school officials 143 and that school discipline must be
confined to the “metes and bounds of the school itself.” 144
The student expression in Porter similarly fell within the
protection of the First Amendment. The student in that case drew a
violent illustration at home that depicted his school campus under
siege. 145 The sketch was concealed in his closet for two years and
only inadvertently taken to school by his brother. 146 School
administrators responded by allowing the student to enroll in an
alternative school conditioned on his waiving his right to an expulsion
hearing. 147 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that the case fell outside the scope of Tinker and, even if a
substantial disruption had ensued, the school overstepped its
bounds. 148 The student “never intended [his sketch] to be brought to
campus” and “took no action to . . . publicize[] in a way certain to
result in its appearance [on-campus].” 149
Moreover, in Layshock, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit found that the First Amendment protected a high school
student who was suspended for creating a Myspace profile of his
140 Thomas

v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045(2d Cir. 1979).

141 Id.
142 Id.

at 1050.
id. at 1051 (“[T]he First Amendment forbids public school administrators and
teachers from regulating the material to which a child is exposed after he leaves school each
afternoon. . . . The risk is simply too great that school officials will punish protected speech and
thereby inhibit future expression.”) (emphasis added).
144 Id. at 1052. The court noted that it could envision a case in which students incite
substantial disruption within the school from some other location. However, under the facts of
the case at bar, there was no threat of such disruption. Id. at 1052 n.17.
145 Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 612.
148 See id. at 615 (“This is not exactly speech on campus or even speech directed at
campus.”).
149 Id. at 615, 620.
143 See
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principal. 150 The student created the profile at home, but used school
computers to show his classmates. 151 The Third Circuit determined
that “[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the
state in the guise of school authorities to reach into a child’s home
and control his/her actions there to the same extent that they can
control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored
activities.” 152 The court expressed reluctance to expand the arm of
school authority beyond the school, although the circumstances of the
case did not require that the parameters of this authority be defined.153
Finally, in Blue Mountain, the Third Circuit held that the school
district violated a middle-school student’s First Amendment speech
rights when it suspended her for speech that “caused no substantial
disruption in school and that could not reasonably have led school
officials to forecast substantial disruption in school.” 154 The court
found it significant that the student did not even intend for the speech
to reach the school and, in fact, “took specific steps to make the
profile ‘private’ so that only her friends could access it.” 155 The court
noted that “[t]he fact that her friends happen to be [classmates] is not
surprising, and does not mean that [her] speech targeted the
school.” 156
Admittedly, the sting of words transmitted from a home computer
or cell phone is often felt within the school and may even result in a
substantial disruption. 157 However, using the “substantial disruption”
test to regulate off-campus student expression severely undermines
the First Amendment. 158 As one commentator has noted, “an overuse
of the Tinker justification against off-campus cyberbullying could
lead to an abuse of school power and chill student conduct that is
normally protected under the Constitution.” 159 Another argued that
subjecting off-campus student speakers to punishment merely because
their expression rouses the school community “poses an intolerable
threat to the First Amendment rights of students.” 160 The misuse of
150 Layshock

v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2010).
at 252–53.
152 Id. at 260.
153 Id. at 263. The Third Circuit found no evidence that the profile resulted in a substantial
disruption and the school district did not object thereto. Therefore, the school could not justify
its punishment of the student under Tinker. Id.
154 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
155 Id. at 930.
156 Id. at 930–31.
157 See SHARIFF, supra note 41, at 37 (noting that victims of cyberbullying often display
poor academic performance and school avoidance in response to the online attacks).
158 See Calvert, supra note 117, at 287 (“[T]he school’s own internal discipline system . . .
must be reined in before First Amendment rights are needlessly sacrificed.”)
159 Turbert, supra note 32, at 678.
160 Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not Grounds: Protecting Student Internet Speech,
151 Id.
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Tinker to regulate off-campus student Internet speech is inconsistent
with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. Such expression
should instead be afforded the full protection of the First
Amendment. 161
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
Although schools should lack the constitutional authority to
regulate off-campus student speech under most circumstances, society
may address the cyberbullying problem through the criminal justice
system, the civil justice system, and, preferably, through education.
Below, this Note analyzes the prospect that the criminal and civil
justice systems will provide adequate remedies, and finds that they do
not.
A. The Criminal Justice System
The ever-increasing media hype around cyberbullying has led to
demands for more drastic punishment, and the government has
responded accordingly. 162 After Phoebe Prince’s suicide, the district
attorney charged the teens who bullied her with felony charges
ranging from stalking to criminal harassment.163 The individuals
responsible for the Internet broadcast that drove Tyler Clementi to
jump from the George Washington Bridge faced an invasion-ofprivacy charge, but may also find themselves defending against a hate
crime indictment. 164 These two cases demonstrate that the criminal
justice system is one method by which society may deter
cyberbullying.
“The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free
trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people

89 VA. L. REV. 139, 187 (2003).
161 Id. at 159 (“Both policy and logic demand that internet speech be clearly classified as
off-campus speech and afforded the full protection of the First Amendment.”).
162 Jessica Bennett, Is the ‘Bullying Epidemic’ a Media Myth?, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 1,
2010,
9:43
AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/10/01/is-the-bullyingepidemic-a-media-myth.html [hereinafter Media Myth] (describing arguments for and against
creating new punishments for cyberbullying); see also Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made
Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A1 (reporting that chairman Steven
Goldstein of Garden State Equality viewed the recent cyber-bullying related death of gay
college student, Tyler Clementi, as a hate crime).
163 Setoodeh, supra note 1, at 60–63. In May 2011, the teens were placed on probation.
Despite the lenient sentences, David Sullivan, the regional district attorney, said that the
prosecution nonetheless sent the message that “bullying and harassment will not be tolerated in
our schools.” Erick Eckholm, 3 Ex-Students Get Probation in Bullying Linked to a Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 2011, at A19.
164 Tresniowski, supra note 28, at 56.
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might find distasteful or discomforting.” 165 The Supreme Court has
consistently held, however, that the right to free speech is not
limitless. 166 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 167 for instance, the
Court held that a state may punish those words “which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
peace.” 168 That case involved a public speech denouncing all religion
as a racket. 169 When confronted by a city marshal, Chaplinsky called
the man a “God-damned racketeer” and “a damned fascist.” 170 He was
subsequently convicted under a New Hampshire incitement statute.171
In upholding the conviction, the Court reasoned that some words are
“of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.” 172 Under Chaplinsky, therefore, students could
face criminal sanctions if they communicate words that would cause
an average addressee to fight.173 But because the Supreme Court has
limited the fighting words doctrine to face-to-face confrontation, 174
however, the criminal sanctions implicated thereby would be limited
to traditional instances of bullying, making it inapposite to Internet
cyberbullying.

165 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
166 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”)
167 315 U.S. 568.
168 Id. at 572.
169 Id. at 569–70.
170 Id. at 569.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 572.
173 See Id. at 573–74 (applying a standard of whether epithets would be likely to cause an
average person to retaliate in upholding the challenged statute). The likelihood that a fighting
words charge would succeed is unclear. Free-speech expert Robert O’Neil criticized the
Chaplinsky decision in that it “has caused no end of confusion during the ensuing six decades.”
Robert M. O’Neil, Rights in Conflict: The First Amendment’s Third Century, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2002, at 7, 18. However, because courts often consider the
circumstances surrounding the verbal assault, a fighting words charge is more likely to stick if
the words are accompanied by threatening conduct. David L. Hudson Jr., Fighting Words, FIRST
AMENDMENT
CTR.,
http://archive.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/personal/topic.aspx?topic=fighting_words (July
2009).
174 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The defendant in Cohen was observed
outside a courthouse wearing a jacket that said “Fuck the Draft.” Id. at 16. The Supreme Court
rejected application of the fighting words doctrine in that the jacket was not a face-to-face
personal insult. Id. at 20. “While the four-letter word displayed by Cohen in relation to the draft
is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly
not directed to the person of the hearer. No individual actually or likely to be present could
reasonably have regarded the words on [his] jacket as a direct personal insult.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Cyberbullies could also face criminal liability under the true threat
doctrine. “True threats” include those statements which
“communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.” 175 The Supreme Court has determined that such speech
is beyond the protection of the First Amendment. The Court first
discussed true threats in Watts v. United States. 176 In that case,
Respondent told a crowd of demonstrators that “[i]f they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” 177
The Court concluded that this statement constituted a constitutionally
protected political hyperbole rather than a true threat against the
President. 178 More recently, in Virginia v. Black, 179 the Court found
that a Virginia criminal statute did not violate the First Amendment
insofar as it banned cross burning with intent to intimidate. Cross
burning is almost certain to inspire fear of bodily harm and,
accordingly, the court held that a ban on such conduct is permissible
under the First Amendment. 180 Unfortunately, outside of Watts and
Black, the Court has offered little guidance as to what constitutes a
true threat.
Many courts have employed the reasonable person standard when
determining whether a statement amounts to a true threat. 181 Under
the reasonable person standard, courts look to whether a reasonable
person would interpret the threat as a serious expression of intent to
cause harm. 182 Factors relevant to this determination may include the
reaction of the recipient, whether the threat was conditional, and how
the threat was communicated.183 In Doe v. Pulaski County Special
School District, 184 a student prepared two violent and obscenity-laced
letters to an ex-girlfriend expressing a desire to molest, rape, and
murder her. 185 The student prepared both letters in his home, where
they remained until they were discovered by another student.186 That
175 Virginia

v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
U.S. 705 (1969).
177 Id. at 706.
178 Id. at 708.
179 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003).
180 Id. at 363. However, the statute also allowed any such burning as prima facie evidence
of intent to intimidate. The Court struck down the provision in that “[t]he First Amendment does
not permit such a shortcut.” Id. at 367.
181 See, e.g., Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002)
(finding that courts have consistently adopted the reasonable person test in making this
determination).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 623.
184 306 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2002).
185 Id. at 619.
186 Id.
176 394
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student took one of the letters and delivered it to the female
student. 187 The court concluded that, because “a reasonable recipient
would have perceived [the] letter as a serious expression of intent to
harm” the female student, they amounted to a true threat.188
In addition to the incitement and true-threat doctrines, cyberbullies
could face criminal liability for harassment and stalking. In Phoebe
Prince’s case, the District Attorney decided to bring criminal charges
for harassment and stalking against those who had bullied Phoebe
after an investigation revealed conduct that “far exceeded the limits of
normal teenage relationship-related quarrels.” 189 This unprecedented
move caused quite a stir in the small Massachusetts town. The
superintendent of South Hadley schools was surprised that the District
Attorney drew such a strong connection between the bullying and
suicide. 190 Others, including parents whose children were also bullied,
were pleased that the District Attorney brought the charges. 191
There are clearly methods under existing criminal law by which
cyberbullies can be punished. However, most attacks by cyberbullies,
despite their injurious consequences, do not rise to the level of
criminal conduct. 192 One proposed solution is to cast a wider net. The
Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act,193 for instance, sought to
make cyberbullying a federal crime. Representative Linda Sánchez,
primary author of the bill, argued before the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security that law enforcement needs the
tools to punish “serious, repeated, and hostile communications . . .
.” 194 Under her bill, it would be a federal offense to “transmit[] in
interstate or foreign commerce any communication, with the intent to
coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a

187 Id.

at 619–620.
at 626.
189 Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 4, at A14 (these felony charges included “statutory
rape, violation of civil rights with bodily injury, harassment, stalking and disturbing a school
assembly”).
190 Schworm & Ballou, supra note 12.
191 See Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 4, at A16 (reporting that a South Hadley parent
whose daughter had also been bullied by one of the accused bullies was “pleased that the
charges were brought”).
192 See Turbert, supra note 32, at 680 (noting that most instances of cyberbullying are not
serious enough to justify criminal penalties); Zande, supra note 43, at 121 (noting that most
cyberbullying acts will not rise to the level of threat of violence contemplated by the true threat
doctrine).
193 H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. § 881 (2009).
194 Cyberbullying and Other Online Safety Issues for Children: Hearing on H.R. 1966 and
H.R. 3630 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 23 (2009) [hereinafter Cyberbullying Hearing] (testimony of Rep.
Linda T. Sánchez).
188 Id.
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person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and
hostile behavior . . . .” 195
The strong arm of criminal law can certainly deter and punish
some instances of cyberbullying, but cyberbullying raises unique
issues that criminalization fails to address.196 Nancy Willard, Director
for the Center for Safe and Responsible Internet Use, noted during the
congressional hearing that criminalization would actually detract from
prevention efforts.197 Willard argued that it is more important to
invest in comprehensive, in-depth prevention and intervention efforts
to stop the behavior from occurring in the first place. 198 Other
commentators also criticized The Megan Meier Act as too harsh. 199
Berin Szoka and Adam Theirer asserted that criminal records,
particularly felony records, should not be doled out for peer-to-peer
harassment. 200 Such a result would stigmatize offenders for life
because of their childhood blunders. 201
In expanding existing criminal law to include more instances of
bullying behavior, lawmakers must also be mindful of the First
Amendment. Off-campus Internet speech should be entitled to First
Amendment protection, whether the speech is produced by a student
or an adult. 202 As the Supreme Court observed in Texas v. Johnson,203
“[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.” 204 Hence, lawmakers must be careful to differentiate
between criminally sanctionable conduct and constitutionally
protected speech. 205
195 H.R.

1966, §881(a).
Cyberbullying Hearing, supra note 194, at 103 (statement of Nancy Willard,
Director, Center for Safe & Responsible Internet Use, et al) (“The complexity of [cyberbullying]
cannot . . . be addressed by simply declaring [it] illegal.”); Alison Virginia King, Note,
Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens
and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 855 (2010) (arguing that cybercrimes raise unique
issues that might not be adequately addressed by existing criminal law).
197 Cyberbullying Hearing, supra note 194, at 103 (statement of Nancy Willard, Director,
Ctr. for Safe & Responsible Internet Use, et al.).
198 Id.
199 See id. at 170 (testimony of Berin Szoka & Adam D. Theirer, The Progress & Freedom
Foundation) (arguing that the act would punish children rather than protect them).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Tuneski, supra note 160, at 162–63 (“[O]ff-campus speech of students should be treated
and subject to the same strict scrutiny afforded to the off-campus speech of adults.”).
203 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
204 Id. at 414.
205 See Cyberbullying Vs. Free Speech, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 3:31 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/01/30/scitech/pcanswer/main3768945.shtml (“We need
to be careful to draw the line between harmful harassment and constitutionally protected
196 See
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B. The Civil Justice System
In addition to criminal liability, cyberbullies may also be subject to
civil liability. Defamation is one possible civil cause of action.206
Cyberbullying is defamatory because it “tends so to harm the
reputation of [the victim] as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter [others] from associating or dealing with
him.” 207 As compared to spoken words, written words are more
permanent, capable of wider circulation, and show greater
deliberation and intention on the part of the speaker. 208 Because
written words are particularly destructive, they more frequently lead
to defamation actions.209 Hence, anyone who posts something that
injures the reputation of another could face a defamation lawsuit.
However, in a defamation action the victim must also prove that
the damaging statements were false.210 Thus, while a defamation
action may ensnare false rumors, it does nothing to curtail harmful
statements that are truthful. For instance, a student who was
relentlessly bullied because of his sexual orientation would be unable
to sue his attacker for defamation.
Invasion of privacy is an alternative option that may be employed
where the elements of defamation are not met. The Second
Restatement of Torts provides that:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that . . .
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and . . . is
not of legitimate concern to the public.211
Although the Supreme Court has held that there can be no liability
for publicizing information that is a matter of public record,212 the
posts and text messages written by bullies more often involve matters

speech.”).
206 Calvert, supra note 117, at 247–48 (relating that the teacher in Bethlehem sued the
student for defamation, interference with contractual relations, invasion of privacy, and loss of
consortium).
207 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
208 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS
§ 2.3, at 2–10 (4th ed. 2011).
209 See id. at 2–9, 2–10 (explaining that it is easier for a libeled plaintiff to recover for
written defamation).
210 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) (1977) (indicating that the first
element of defamation is “a false and defamatory statement concerning another [individual]”).
211 Id. § 652D.
212 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).

11/6/2011 4:02:30 PM

258

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

of private concern. Thus, a bullying victim may bring an invasion of
privacy action against a bully who publicizes private information
about him.
The victim might also sue his bully for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. “[The individual] who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress . . . .” 213 This
cause of action is limited, however, in that it does not extend to mere
insults, humiliations, or threats. 214
Despite numerous causes of action available to victims, the civil
justice system fails as a practical solution to cyberbullying for several
reasons. First, victims often hide their victimization from their parents
for fear that they will be bullied even more. 215 Parents cannot initiate
a civil suit if they are unaware that their child is being bullied. Even if
the parents were aware of the situation, a lawsuit further publicizes
the potentially embarrassing facts giving rise to the bullying. Second,
because a bully can hide behind screen names and e-mails, it may be
difficult to ascertain his identity. 216 Therefore, while the civil justice
system is always an option, cyberbullying presents unique issues that
the current system is unable to address. More is needed to adequately
address the problem. 217
C. An Education-Based Approach
Many teens are immature and cannot comprehend the
consequences of their actions. 218 Through an education-based
approach, bullies may be better able to understand the impact of their
behavior on others. 219
Several organizations have already launched online campaigns to
educate Americans of all ages. In the early 1990’s, a short film called
Trevor told the story of a gay thirteen-year-old boy who attempted
suicide after his peers rejected him. 220 Trevor inspired the
establishment of the Trevor Project to focus on crisis and suicide
213 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
cmt. d.
215 See Kelleher, supra note 39 (student explains to House committee that victims are often
scared to tell adults they are being cyberbullied for fear that the situation will worsen).
216 SHARIFF, supra note 41, at 37 (bullies often hide behind anonymous screen names and
e-mails).
217 But see Calvert, supra note 117, at 245–46 (arguing that the criminal and civil justice
systems are sufficient in themselves to deal with all improper Internet conduct).
218 Media Myth, supra note 162.
219 See Stop Cyberbullying, supra note 55 (noting that most bullies do not understand the
full impact their behavior has on their victims).
220 Trevor – The Film, THE TREVOR PROJECT, http://www.thetrevorproject.org/TrevorFilm
(last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
214 Id.
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prevention among lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT)
teens. 221 Following the rash of teen suicides in the fall of 2010, the
Trevor Project launched the “It Gets Better” campaign, which
involved celebrities such as Ellen DeGeneres and Tim Gunn, filming
testimonial videos of support. 222 The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services recently organized an anti-bullying campaign aimed
at five- to eight-year-old children. Students can access the “Stop
Bullying Now” campaign online for educational information, games,
and videos. 223 The site also has a section where parents can learn
about bullying awareness, prevention, and intervention. 224 MTV’s “A
Thin Line” campaign aims to help teens “identify, respond to, and
stop the spread of digital abuse,” 225 providing information concerning
textual harassment and cyberbullying in a teen-friendly format. 226
These messages offer a unique approach in that they tend to focus
on bullying itself, rather than the means by which it is communicated.
They do not differentiate between the traditional and cyber forms of
bullying. While the consequences of cyberbullying are more
severe, 227 preventive measures aimed at all forms of bullying may be
more effective than those aimed at a particular mode.228
A solution to the bullying epidemic also requires educators,
parents, and the community to take a stand. By our inaction, we are
all part of the problem. 229 Teachers and school officials at South
Hadley High School have been subject to harsh criticism for failing to
take any action to protect Phoebe Prince. School officials never
contacted her parents to discuss the problem. 230 One report indicated
that a staff member idly looked on as Phoebe suffered verbal attacks

221 About Trevor, THE TREVOR PROJECT, http://www.thetrevorproject.org/organization
(last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
222 ‘Project Runway’ Star Discloses Teen Suicide Attempt, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2010, at
C4. For various celebrity testimonials created for The Trevor Project, see TrevorProjectMedia’s
Channel, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/trevorprojectmedia (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
223 Kids, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/kids/index.html (last visited
Sept. 28, 2011).
224 Parents, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/parents/index.html (last
visited Sept. 28, 2011).
225 About Us, A THIN LINE, http://www.athinline.org/about (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
226 Id.
227 See supra Part I (discussing the effects of cyberbullying).
228 See Cyberbullying Hearing, supra note 194, at 126 (testimony of John Palfrey, Law
Professor, Harvard School of Law) (“[F]ocus less on the cyber part of cyberbullying and think
of it as bullying . . . .”); id. at 153 (statement of Michael W. MacLeod-Ball, Acting Director,
American Civil Liberties Union Washington Legislative Office) (arguing that lawmakers should
consider more than the particular modes of communication used to convey the threats).
229 20/20
(ABC
television
broadcast
Oct.
15,
2010),
available
at
http://abc.go.com/watch/2020/SH559026/VD5592259/bullied-to-death-victims-stories.
230 Dorning, supra note 1.
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in the library, just hours before she hanged herself. 231 Although the
school’s inaction was not criminal, the District Attorney called it
“troublesome.” 232 Some believe that a better-informed school
community could have saved Phoebe; Phoebe’s aunt explained that
“[t]he signs were there [but] there was no support.” 233
One reason why teachers and school administrators have failed in
protecting bullied students is that they may not understand the
injurious effects of bullying. It is crucial that the school community
receive training to detect, respond to, and prevent such behavior. The
Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, which seeks to prevent and
reduce bullying in schools, has served as a model for communities all
around the country. 234 The program encourages schools, among other
things, to establish antibullying committees and hold staff
discussions. 235
Schools can also create forums where students, teachers, and
parents can collectively discuss bullying issues and solutions, such as
the anti-bullying task force that South Hadley High School
implemented after Phoebe Prince’s suicide. 236 One parent,
commenting on the task force’s efforts, stated that “[t]eachers are
more receptive to our complaints.” 237
It is equally important that schools “establish and maintain a
school climate of respect and integrity” and punish students for oncampus violations. 238 Schools play a very important, albeit secondary,
role in socializing children.239 They must teach students that bullying
behavior will not be tolerated at school.240 The Olweus Bullying
Prevention Program asks school administrators to “ensure that all
staff intervene on the spot when bullying occurs.” 241

231 Marie Szaniszlo & Laura Crimaldi, Parent Details Phoebe’s Agonizing Final Moment,
BOS. HERALD, April 2, 2010, at News 004.
232 Peter Schworm, Schools Head Defends Response to Bullying, BOS. GLOBE, April 1,
2010, at Metro 1.
233 Setoodeh, supra note 1, at 63.
234 See
The Olweus Bullying Prevention Program Overview, OLWEUS,
http://www.olweus.org/public/bullying_prevention_program.page (last visited Sept. 28, 2011)
(noting that some high schools and kindergartens have used the program).
235 Id.
236 Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 4, at A16.
237 Setoodeh, supra note 1, at 63.
238 Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 47, at 4.
239 See Steven Brint, Schools and Socialization, in CHILDHOOD SOCIALIZATION 157, 157
(Gerald Handel ed., 2d ed. 2006) (“Schools play a secondary role to families in socializing
children.”); see also id. at 158 (describing the process through which children are trained on
moral values and acceptable standards of conduct through their experiences in the classroom).
240 See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 47, at 3–4 (arguing that schools should create a
culture where bullying is not tolerated by staff or students).
241 OLWEUS, supra note 234.
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To reinforce the antibullying message, schools can implement
creative disciplinary measures aimed at education. For instance, a
bully might be required to create an informational poster for public
display. 242 Such a punishment would educate not only the bully, but
also those students who view the poster. Schools could also request
that students sign an antibullying pledge. 243 One reason students bully
is that they witness similar behavior from others. 244 Perhaps seeing
their classmates promise to respect others will encourage would-be
bullies to do the same.
Children may be more likely to hear and appreciate the message if
it comes from both their school and their parents. Schools should
invite parents to join their antibullying committees and discussions.245
Parents could then reinforce at home what their children are learning
about bullying in school. They may explain the reasons that people
bully, that bullying is harmful and has injurious consequences, and
that students face punishment for engaging in such behavior.246
Parents should also teach their children about responsible Internet
use, clearly communicating and consistently enforcing Internet
rules. 247 Parents can easily monitor that these rules are complied with
by keeping computers in a highly trafficked room. 248
Community commitment also plays an important role in
remedying the bullying problem. Community leaders can raise
awareness about the issue, and spread antibullying messages
throughout the community. 249 For instance, they could sponsor a
bullying awareness day for students to learn about the problem in a
fun, yet educational environment. They could also invite students,
parents, and educators to attend community discussions. 250
Even bystanders may take action. “[B]y doing nothing,
[bystanders] are doing something.” 251 By allowing bullying to
continue in our presence, we may inadvertently condone the behavior.
242 Stop

Cyberbullying, supra note 55.

243 Id.
244 See
Recognizing
the
Warning
Signs,
STOPBULLYING.GOV,
http://www.stopbullying.gov/topics/warning_signs/index.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011)
(listing as a warning sign that a child is a bully that he or she “[h]as friends who bully others”).
245 See OLWEUS, supra note 234 (advocating the creation of “Bullying Prevention
Coordinating Committee”).
246 See Stop Cyberbullying, supra note 55 (listing ways parents can help their children if
they are being bullied).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 OLWEUS, supra note 234.
250 See id. (advocating, as a community-level component to helping victims of bullying, for
increased involvement of community members in a “Bully Prevention Coordinating
Committee”).
251 Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 47, at 5.
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Bystanders “can make a huge difference” by standing up for a
victim. 252
The Adolescent Web Awareness Requires Education (AWARE)
Act incorporates this sort of educational approach. 253 The AWARE
Act authorizes $125 million in grants to establish Internet crime
awareness and prevention programs. 254 Educational organizations,
nonprofit organizations, and schools may use the grants to develop
professional training programs for teachers and administrators and
educational campaigns for parents about teaching children how to
protect themselves from cybercrimes.255 The AWARE Act aims to
inspire nonprofit Internet-safety organizations, schools, and
communities to join forces to educate students, teachers, and parents
about these risks. 256
Experts have commended the scope and purpose of the AWARE
Act. Michael W. MacLeod-Ball of the American Civil Liberties
Union described the bill as “a better step forward than an overbroad
attempt to criminalize certain kinds of online speech.” 257 John
Palfrey, a Harvard Law School professor, said “the education support
described in the ‘AWARE Act’ is precisely the right place to start
from here.” 258
However, some commentators have criticized the AWARE Act.
While the education-based approach requires substantial funding,
some commentators would rather see federal funds employed
differently. 259 House subcommittee member Representative Louie
Gohmert questioned whether the government should “spend another
$125 million of Chinese money that we will have to borrow in order
to insert the Federal bureaucracy into a problem whose true resolution
begins at home.” 260
252 Id.
253 See Adolescent Web Awareness Requires Education Act, H.R. 3630, 111th Cong. §
2(d) (2009) (requiring the funds provided by the act to be used for training and education to
promote the identification and prevention of cyberbullying).
254 Cyberbullying Hearing, supra note 194, at 34 (testimony of Rep. Debbie Wasserman
Schultz).
255 See H.R. 3630 § 2(d) (limiting the funding of AWARE to programs aimed at
identification and prevention of cyberbullying).
256 See Cyberbullying Hearing, supra note 194, at 34 (testimony of Rep. Debbie
Wasserman Schultz) (stating that AWARE’s grant program will encourage nonprofit
organizations, schools and communities to work together to educate others about the dangers
associated with cyberbullying).
257 Cyberbullying Hearing, supra note 194, at 152 (statement of Michael W. MacLeodBall, Acting Director, American Civil Liberties Union Washington Legislative Office).
258 Cyberbullying Hearing, supra note 194, at 126 (testimony of John Palfrey, Law
Professor, Harvard School of Law).
259 See id. at 137 (statement of Judi Westberg Warren, President, Web Wise Kids) (noting
the difficulty in funding programs such as the one proposed in the AWARE Act).
260 Id. at 20 (statement of Rep. Louis Gohmert).
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Despite its limitations, an education-based approach can create
room to prevent cyberbullying where the Constitution leaves none.
Given the troublesome situation many teens face today, educators
have a moral duty to incorporate bullying awareness into their
curriculum. Parents and community members have a similar
obligation. The bullying epidemic will undoubtedly continue in the
absence of collaboration from everyone to reverse its trend. 261 It is
true, however, that these ideas cannot be realized without proper
funding.
D. A Legislative Proposal
Education is primarily a state and local responsibility and,
consequently, the federal role in education is limited. 262 Schools and
local municipalities are in the best position to determine the conduct
that they should prohibit. In his concurring opinion in Morse, Justice
Breyer noted that, because “[s]tudents will test the limits of
acceptable behavior in myriad ways better known to schoolteachers
than to judges[,] school officials need a degree of flexible authority to
respond to disciplinary challenges.” 263 Accordingly, states are entitled
to enact their own laws aimed at bullying awareness and prevention.
Laws in nearly every state address bullying or harassment in
schools. 264 In recent years, legislators have amended many of them to
reach electronic communications.265 Section Five of the Illinois
School Code now provides that:
No student shall be subjected to bullying . . . during any
school sponsored education program or activity; . . . while in
school, on school property, on school buses or other school
vehicles, at designated school bus stops waiting for the school
261 See Andrew Hartzell, Fighting Back: Bullying Prevention Under Ohio Law, 25 OHIO
LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2011, at 8, 11 (“All involved—students, school administrators, parents and the
legal community—need to be educated, involved and proactive in their approach to curtailing
the bullying situation . . . .”).
262 See
Federal
Role
in
Education,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html?src=ln (last updated Mar. 30, 2011) (noting
that education is primarily a State responsibility and that the federal government only
contributes 10.8 percent of all spending on primary and secondary education).
263 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 428 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring).
264 As of the date of publication of this article, South Dakota is the only state without a
policy regarding bullying or harassment. State and Federal Bullying Information, OLWEUS
BULLYING PREVENTION PROGRAM, http://www.olweus.org/public/bullying_laws.page (last
visited Sept. 28, 2011).
265 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1–279.6 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010) (requiring the
Board of Education to establish guidelines and model policies that include standards for school
board policies on the use of electronic means for the purposes of bullying, harassment, and
intimidation).
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bus, or at school-sponsored or school-sanctioned events or
activities; or . . . through the transmission of information from
a school computer, a school computer network, or other
similar electronic school equipment. 266
Unfortunately, the widespread misuse of Tinker has led some
states to go too far in extending the definition of electronic
communications in their anti-bullying statutes. For example, under an
Oklahoma statute the electronic communication need not originate at
school or with school equipment, but is included under the policy if it
is “specifically directed at students or school personnel.” 267 This
impermissibly includes student expression that occurs entirely offcampus. Moreover, to date, many states have not embraced the
education-based approach of the AWARE Act and the Olweus
Bullying Prevention Program.
Because education itself cannot eradicate bullying, it is equally
important that the law include remedial measures. 268 Teachers should
be required to report bullying behavior to a designated authority
within the school, and school officials should have a legal duty to
investigate all reported incidents. Moreover, schools should have to
notify parents whenever their student is involved in a bullying
incident, whether the child was the bully or the victim.
If state legislatures fail to adopt cyberbullying laws or, as the
Oklahoma legislature has done, adopt overly broad laws in
contravention of the First Amendment, Congress may consider
enacting laws of its own. Federal legislation would provide Congress
the opportunity to differentiate speech that is constitutionally
protected from that which is subject to school discipline. Congress
could adopt the language of the Illinois School Code 269 and explicitly
define the school environment. In consideration of modern
technology, the definition should provide that speech communicated
at school via phone, school computer, or any other digital technology
is considered on-campus speech and regulated where it causes a
substantial disruption. This will clarify a point that has been
complicated by inconsistent judicial rulings. In addition, States that
allow for punishment of student speech outside that environment
could risk losing their funding.

266 105

ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/27–23.7(a)(1)–(3) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) (emphasis

added).
267 OKLA.

STAT. § 70–24–100.3 (2008).
King, supra note 196, at 883 (arguing that educational tools work best when
combined with disciplinary measures).
269 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/27–23.7 (West Supp. 2010).
268 See
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Federal legislation could also provide a remedy for the states’
failure to adopt an education-based approach, conditioning the receipt
of funds on the development of awareness and prevention campaigns
for students, professional training programs for teachers, or
educational campaigns for parents. That the federal government
normally plays a limited role in education does not prevent it from
fixing the terms upon which education funding shall be disbursed. In
South Dakota v. Dole, 270 the Supreme Court held that Congress may,
under its spending power, attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds, provided that such conditions meet certain requirements. First,
the exercise of the spending power “must be in pursuit of the general
welfare.” 271 Congress must also state any condition of funding
unambiguously, thereby “enabling the States to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”272
Moreover, conditions on federal grants may be illegitimate if they are
unrelated “to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs” or there is an independent constitutional bar to the
funding. 273 Finally, Congress must ensure that its financial
inducement does not rise to the level of unconstitutional coercion or
compulsion. 274
Congress could easily adopt antibullying legislation that meets the
requirements set forth in Dole. First, laws that address bullying serve
an undeniably public purpose, which is of chief concern to the
Department of Education, of ensuring a safe and disciplined school
climate. 275 Moreover, this legislation would not induce the states to
act in an unlawful manner, 276 there is no independent constitutional
bar to the funding. Schools receive only ten percent of their funds
from the federal government and this conditional grant would involve
only a small fraction of that funding. This can hardly be considered
coercive. Therefore, provided that all conditions are unambiguously
stated, Congress may enact a law that conditions the receipt of federal
education funding on compliance with its anti-bullying legislation.

270 483

U.S. 203 (1987).
at 207 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
272 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
273 Id. at 207–08 (internal quotation marks omitted).
274 Id. at 211.
275 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007—12 12 (2007),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/strat/plan2007-12/2007-plan.pdf (identifying the
promotion of a safe and disciplined learning environment as one of the Department of
Education’s objectives in improving student achievement).
276 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (holding that Congress may not use its spending power to
induce state action that would itself be unconstitutional).
271 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Cyberbullying is a rising concern that our nation is obligated to
address. The line between on- and off-campus speech has become so
blurred, and caused so much confusion, that clear boundaries must be
drawn. The answer, however, does not lie in stripping students of
their First Amendment rights. A student who speaks outside the
“schoolhouse gate” is no longer a student and, therefore, Tinker does
not apply. He or she is instead a “person,” and should be afforded the
full protection of the First Amendment. The criminal and civil justice
systems might allow victims, parents, and communities to punish
bullies that go too far, but it is clear that significant inadequacies exist
in both regimes. Neither criminal or civil penalties would sufficiently
curtail cyberbullying and its effects. An education-based approach
can fill the voids left by these systems of justice. Either the state or
federal government should enact laws aimed at bullying awareness
and prevention. Such laws will enable schools, parents, and
community members to better explain the consequences of bullying,
and the heightened abuse of cyberbullying, behavior to teens. It is
only through a communal collaboration that the bullying epidemic
can be appropriately addressed.
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